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SECRET

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00329 01 OF 03 100023Z ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-10 IO-13 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-05 SP-02 SS-15 ICA-11 TRSE-00 NSC-05 /094 W

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 MBFR VIENNA 0329

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJ: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: AHG REPORT TO NAC ON NEW EASTERN

PROPOSALS

ON JUNE 9, THE AD HOC GROUP APPROVED THE FOLLOWING PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE NAC ON THE NEW PROPOSALS FORMALLY INTRODUCED BY THE EAST ON JUNE 8:

BEGIN TEXT:

REPORT TO THE COUNCIL ON THE EASTERN PROPOSALS OF JUNE 8, 1978

INTRODUCTION

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00329 01 OF 03 100023Z

1. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES AT THE JUNE 7 INFORMAL SESSION INTRODUCED NEW EASTERN PROPOSALS, AS A RESPONSE TO THE WESTERN INITIATIVE OF APRIL 19, 1978. THE EAST THEN TABLED THE NEW PROPOSALS AT THE JUNE 8 PLENARY SESSION. THE AD HOC GROUP OBTAINED CLARIFICATION AT THE JUNE 7 INFORMAL SESSION ON CERTAIN POINTS IN THE EASTERN PROPOSALS. WESTERN

NEGOTIATORS PLAN TO REQUEST EASTERN EXPLANATION OF MANY OTHER POINTS WHICH ARE UNCLEAR.

- 2. THIS REPORT PRESENTS A TENTATIVE SUMMARY OF THE NEW EASTERN PROPOSALS, BASED ON INFORMATION AVAILABLE UP TO JUNE 9. THE REPORT IS DIVIDED INTO TWO SECTIONS: 1) A WESTERN TRANSLATION OF THE TEXT OF EASTERN PROPOSALS, AS CIRCULATED AT JUNE 8 PLENARY SESSION; 2) COMMENTARY ON THE TEXT, INCLUDING INITIAL INFORMATION MADE AVAILABLE BY THE EAST IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS IN THE JUNE 7 INFORMAL.
- 3. THE AD HOC GROUP WILL SEND TO THE COUNCIL NEXT WEEK A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF THE EASTERN PROPOSALS AS WELL AS FURTHER INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE EAST ON THESE PROPOSALS.

I TEXT OF EASTERN PROPOSALS

PROPOSALS BY THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, THE POLISH REPOLE'S REPUBLIC, THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC; AND THE CZECHOSLOVAK SOCIALIST REPUBLIC SUBMITTED ON "8" JUNE. 1978.

GUIDED BY THE DESIRE TO ENSURE PROGRESS AT THE VIENNA
NEGOTIATIONS AND TO REACH A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT,
THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, THE POLISH REPOLE'S REPUBLIC,
THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC AND THE CZECHOSLOVAK
SOCIALIST REPUBLIC ARE SUBMITTING NEW PROPOSALS.
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SECRET

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00329 01 OF 03 100023Z

IN DOING SO, THEY PROCEED FROM THE PRINCIPLE OF AN EQUAL-PERCENTAGE REDUCTION OF FORCES AND FROM THE FACT OF THE EXISTENCE OF AN APPROXIMATE EQUALITY IN THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE NATO AND WARSAW TREATY COUNTRIES IN CENTRAL EUROPE, AS WELL AS FROM THE NECESSITY TO UNDERTAKE EFFECTIVE MEASURES FOR DECREASING THE HIGH CONCENTRATION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN THIS AREA.

GIVEN THE AGREEMENT OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES TO THE PRINCIPLE OF AN EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTION AND TO THE APPROXIMATE EQUALITY IN THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES, THE SIDES COULD, DURING 3-4 YEARS, REDUCE THEIR ARMED FORCES BY AN APPROXIMATE EQUAL PERCENTAGE (THE WEST BY 91,000 MEN, AND THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES BY 105,000 MEN.) IN THIS PROCESS ALL THE STATES-DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS MUST TAKE PART IN THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS. AFTER THE REDUCTION, THE NATO AND WARSAW TREATY STATES WOULD EACH HAVE IN THE REDUCTION AREA AN EQUAL NUMERICAL STRENGTH

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PAGE 01 MBFR V 00329 02 OF 03 100033Z ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-10 IO-13 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-05 SP-02 SS-15 ICA-11 TRSE-00 NSC-05 (ISO) W

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AMEMBASSY LONDON
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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 MBFR VIENNA 0329

IN THEIR ARMED FORCES -- $900,\!000$ MEN INCLUDING $700,\!000$ IN GROUND FORCES.

THE REDUCTIONS WOULD BE CARRIED OUT IN TWO STAGES.

THE FIRST STAGE

- 1. IN THE FIRST STAGE, WHICH WILL BE OF A DURATION OF ONE YEAR, THE USA AND THE USSR WOULD REDUCE THEIR GROUND FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE BY 7 PERCENT OF THEIR NUMERICAL STRENGTH (THE USSR BY APPROXIMATELY 30,000 MEN AND THE USA BY APPROXIMATELY 14,000 MEN).
- 2. IN THIS CONTEXT, THE USSR WOULD REDUCE AND WITHDRAW TO ITS TERRITORY ONE ARMY CORPS HEADQUARTERS WITH SUPPORT AND SERVICE UNITS, TWO DIVISIONS AT FULL STRENGTH AND A NUMBER OF INDIVIDUAL TANK UNITS AND SUBUNITS, EQUIVALENT TO ONE TANK DIVISION, AS WELL AS 1,000 TANKS AND 250 MECHANIZED INFANTRY SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00329 02 OF 03 100033Z

COMBAT VEHICLES.

- 3. THE USA WOULD WITHDRAW TO ITS TERRITORY TWO-THREE BRIGADES, WHILE THE REMAINING FORCES SUBJECT TO REDUCTION WOULD BE WITHDRAWN IN THE FORM OF OTHER UNITS AND SUBUNITS. IN ADDITION, THE USA WOULD REDUCE 1,000 NUCLEAR WARHEADS, 36 "PERSHING" MISSILE LAUNCHERS AND 54 F-4 DELIVERY AIRCRAFT.
- 4. AFTER THE REDUCTION OF THE USA AND USSR ARMAMENTS REFERRED TO IN THE PRESENT PROPOSALS, THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE NUCLEAR WARHEADS, THE QUANTITY OF "PERSHING" MISSILE LAUNCHERS AND F-4 DELIVERY AIRCRAFT OF THE USA AS WELL AS THE QUANTITY OF SOVIET TANKS WOULD BE LIMITED AT THEIR RESIDUAL LEVEL.
- 5. UPON SIGNING THE FIRST STAGE AGREEMENT, THE USA AND THE USSR WOULD EXCHANGE LISTS SPECIFYING THE ACTUAL IDENTIFICATION, THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH AND THE LOCATION OF THE FORMATIONS, UNITS AND SUBUNITS SUBJECT TO REDUCTION.
- 6. IN THE FIRST STAGE AGREEMENT, THE STATES OTHER THAN THE USA AND THE USSR WOULD UNDERTAKE AN OBLIGATION IN A SECOND STAGE, TO REDUCE THEIR GROUND FORCES IN THE COURSE OF THE 2-3 YEARS AFTER THE COMPLETION OF THE FIRST STAGE.
- 7. THE SCOPE OF THE REDUCTION WOULD BE ESTABLISHED FOR EACH STATE INDIVIDUALLY AND WOULD BE DETERMINED FOR EACH DIRECT PARTICIPANT IN SUCH A WAY AS TO BE APPROXIMATELY PROPORTIONATE TO THE TOTAL NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE FORCES.
- 8. COLLECTIVE LEVELS WOULD BE ESTABLISHED FOR THE OVERALL NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE FORCES OF THE WARSAW TREATY COUNTRIES AND THE NATO COUNTRIES IN CENTRAL EUROPE WITHIN THE SECRET

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PAGE 03 MBFR V 00329 02 OF 03 100033Z

LIMITS INDICATED ABOVE AND UNDER THE OBSERVANCE OF THE FOLLOWING RULES:

- -- FIRSTLY, THE FORCES OF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS,
 WITHOUT ANY EXCEPTIONS WHATSOEVER, WOULD BE COVERED BY THESE
 COLLECTIVE LEVELS, IE.E., NATIONAL LIMITATIONS WOULD NOT BE
 ESTABLISHED ON THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE FORCES OF ANY OF
 THE STATES, INCLUDING THE USSR AND THE USA;
- -- SECONDLY, IN THE CASE OF A POSSIBLE UNILATERAL REDUCTION IN THE FORCES OF ANY OF THE STATES, NO OTHER STATE PARTICIPANTING IN THE REDUCTION AND BELONGING TO THE SAME GROUPING WOULD BE PERMITTED TO INCREASE ITS FORCES BY MORE THAN 50 PERCENT OF THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE FORCES WHICH HAD BEEN REDUCED BY ITS ALLIES, AND MUST NOT UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES, AS A RESULT OF SUCH AN INCREASE, REESTABLISH OR, EVEN MORE IMPORTANTLY, EXCEED THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE FORCES WHICH IT HAD BEFORE

THE REDUCTION.

- -- THIRDLY, THE POST-REDUCTION RESIDUAL NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE FORCES OF EACH STATE COULD NOT BE RAISED THROUGH AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF MILITARY POSITIONS OCCUPIED BY CIVILIANS IN PEACE-TIME.
- 9. ALL PARTIES TO THE AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD UNDERTAKE A REDUCTION OF THEIR FORCES IN THE SECOND STAGE WOULD CARRY IT OUT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AGREEMENT ELABORATED AS A RESULT OF THE SECOND STAGE NEGOTIATIONS, OR, IF SUCH AN AGREEMENT HAD NOT BEEN REACHED, IN CONFORMITY WITH THE METHOD OF REDUCTION OF FORCES ESTABLISHED FOR THE USSR AND THE USA IN THE FIRST STAGE AGREEMENT. IF THIS METHOD WERE TO DIFFER SIGNIFICANTLY FROM THAT ENVISAGED FOR THE REDUCTION OF THE FORCES OF THE USSR AND THE USA, THESE TWO STATES-PARTICIPANTS WOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO CONSIDER THEMSELVES AS NO LONGER BOUND BY THE OBLIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN BY THEM IN THE FIRST STAGE AGREEMENT.

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PAGE 04 MBFR V 00329 02 OF 03 100033Z

SECOND STAGE

- 1. DURING THE FIRST YEAR OF THE SECOND STAGE, ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE USA AND THE USSR WOULD REDUCE THEIR FORCES BY 40 PERCENT OF THE OVERALL NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE FORCES TO BE REDUCED.
- 2. DURING THE SECOND-THIRD YEARS THE ABOVE-MENTIONED STATES WOULD REDUCE THEIR GROUND FORCES BY THE REMAINING 60 PERCENT.
- 3. IN THE SECOND STAGE, THE USA AND THE USSR WOULD FURTHER REDUCE A QUANTITY OF FORCES WHICH, IN PERCENTAGE TERMS, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE REDUCTION OF THEIR FORCES IN THE FIRST STAGE, WOULD CORRESPOND TO THE PERCENTAGE OF THE REDUCTION OF THE FORCES OF ALL THE OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS FROM THE RESPECTIVE MILITARY-POLITICAL GROUPING.

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PAGE 01 MBFR V 00329 03 OF 03 100052Z ACTION ACDA-12 INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-10 IO-13 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-05 SP-02 SS-15 ICA-11 TRSE-00 NSC-05 /094 W

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S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 MBFR VIENNA 0329

GENERAL PROVISIONS

- 1. AFTER THE CONKLUSION OF THE PROCESS OF REDUCTION IN THE FIRST AND SECOND STAGES, IT WOULD NOT BE PROHIBITED TO CARRY OUT A RELOCATION OF THE REMAINING INDIVIDUAL MILITARY FORMATIONS WITHIN THE REDUCTIONS AREA AT THE DISCRETION OF ONE OR ANOTHER STATE. AT THE SAME TIME, IT WOULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO INCREASE THE OVERALL QUANTITY OF GROUND FORCE FORMATIONS AND UNITS WHICH ARE SUBJECT TO THE REDUCTION.
- 2. ALL OTHER ASPECTS OF THE POSITION OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WHICH ARE NOT DEALTH WITH IN THESE PROPOSALS REMAIN AS PREVIOUSLY PRESENTED.

II COMMENTARY ON TEXT

1. THE THIRD PARAGRAPH OF THE TEXT OF THE EASTERN PROPOSALS ASSUMES THE AGREEMENT OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES TO THE ALREADY SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00329 03 OF 03 100052Z

TABLED EASTERN DATA ON WARSAW PACT MANPOWER, WHICH INDICATED THAT THERE IS APPROXIMATE EQUALITY IN THE MILITARY MANPOWER IN THE REDUCTION AREA. WESTERN PARTICIPANTS AT THE JUNE 7 INFORMAL SESSION INQUIRED WHETHER THIS MEANT THAT THE WEST SHOULD AGREE THAT AT PRESENT SUCH PARITY EXISTS, OR WHETHER THIS MEANT SUCH PARITY WAS THE GOAL OF REDUCTIONS AND THAT THE AMOUNT OF REDUCTIONS WOULD BE DETERMINED BY AGREEMENT ON DAT. THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE RESPONDED THAT THE EAST'S PROPOSAL ENVISAGED AN UNDERSTANDING ON DATA ON THE BASIS MAINTAINED BY THE EAST, I.E. WESTERN ACCEPTANCE THAT APPROXIMATE PARITY IN MILITARY MANPOWER ON EACH SIDE WITHN THE AREA ALREADY EXISTS. THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE STATED THAT THE REDUCTION PROPOSALS OF BOTH SIDES

WERE NOW EXPLICITLY DEPENDENT ON AGREEMENT ON DATA. IN RESPONSE TO FURTHER WESTERN QUESTIONING ON THIS POINT, THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE SAID THE RESULTS OF THE DATA DISCUSSION WOULD INFLUENCE THE ACTUAL AMOUNT OF EASTERN AND WESTERN REDUCTIONS.

- 2. EASTERN PARTICIPANTS CONFIRMED THAT THE REDUCTION OF US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCE MANPOWER BY 7 PERCENT OF THEIR NUMERICAL STRENGTH, REFERRED TO IN PARA 1 OF THE SECTION ON FIRST STAGE, MEANT A 7 PERCENT REDUCTION BY EACH OF THESE TWO PARTICIPANTS OF ITS OWN NUMERICAL STRENGTH.
- 3. THE EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES EXPLAINED THAT ALTHOUGH PARA 4 OF THE FIRST STAGE SECTION PROVIDED A LIMITATION ON SOVIET TANKS AT THEIR RESIDUAL LEVEL, THERE WOULD BE NO SUCH LIMIT ON THE RESIDUAL LEVEL OF SOVIET MECHANIZED INFANTRY COMBAT VEHICLES.
- 4. WESTERN PARTICIPANTS INQUIRED IF PARAS 6 AND 7 OF THE FIRST STAGE SECTION MEANT THAT THE COMMITMENT BY WESTERN STATES OTHER THAN THE US IN THE PHASE I AGREEMENT WOULD ONLY BE A COMMITMENT TO REDUCE THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF GROUND FORCE SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00329 03 OF 03 100052Z

PERSONNEL OR IF THESE PARTICIPANTS SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO REDUCE ARMAMENTS AS WELL. THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE EXPLAINED THAT THE FIRST STAGE COMMITMENT WOULD INCLUDE ONLY OBLIGATIONS FOR THESE PARTICIPANTS FOR REDUCTION OF THEIR GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN THE SECOND STAGE, BUT NO DIRECT OBLIGATION TO REDUCE ARMAMENTS. HOW-EVER. THE EAST CONTINUED TO BELIEVE THAT ALL PARTICIPANTS SHOULD REDUCE BY UNITS AND SUBUNITS, TOGETHER WITH THEIR ARMAMENTS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT, AND THE EAST WOULD MAINTAIN THIS POSITION IN THE SECOND STAGE NEGOTIATIONS. THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE ALSO CALLED ATTENTION IN THIS CONNECTION TO PARA 9 OF THE SECTION ON FIRST STAGE. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS PARAGRAPH, UNLESS AGREE-MENT WHICH SPECIFIED OTHERWISE IS REACHED IN THE SECOND STAGE, DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE US AND USSR WOULD CARRY OUT THE REDUCTIONS AGREED IN THE FIRST STAGE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RECUCTION METHOD SPECIFIED FOR THE SOVIET UNION AND THE US IN THE FIRST STAGE, I.E., BY UNITS AND SUBUNITS, AND WITH REDUCTION OF PART OF THEIR ARMAMENTS. EASTERN PARTICIPANTS OF COURSE COULD NOT PROPOSE THAT CANADA OR LUXEMBOURG REDUCE BY DIVISIONS OR BRIGADES, OR THAT COUNTRIES NOT POSSESSING NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS REDUCE SUCH ARMAMENTS.

5. THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE STATED THAT, IN THE EVENT THERE WERE NO SECOND STAGE AGREEMENT, AND THE REDUCTION METHOD USED BY DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN US AND USSR DIFFERED SIGNIFICANTLY FROM THE REDUCTION METHOD OF THE LATTER TWO STATES, THESE TWO STATES WOULD BE FREE OF ALL COMMITMENTS THEY HAD UNDERTAKEN IN THE FIRST STAGE BOTH WITH REGARD TO ARMAMENTS AND MANPOWER. IN

RESPONSE TO A QUESTION AS TO WHETHER HE WAS REFERRING TO SECOND STAGE COMMITMENTS OR THOSE ALREADY IMPLEMENTED IN THE FIRST STAGE, THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE REPLIED THAT HE WAS REFERRING TO STAGE 1 COMMITMENTS ALREADY IMPLEMENTED.

6. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION, THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE EXPLAINED THAT THE THIRD SUBPARA OF PARA 8 IN THE FIRST STAGE SECTION MEANT THERE WOULD BE A FREEZE OF THAT PART OF CIVILIAN PERSONNEL WHO WERE FILLING MILITARY POSITIONS WHICH COULD BE SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 MBFR V 00329 03 OF 03 100052Z

FILLED BY CIVILIANS IN PEACETIME. HE SAID THIS PROVISION WOULD PREVENT A CONCEALED INCREASE IN THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF ARMED FORCES.

7. THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE ALSO CONFIRMED THAT PARA 3 OF THE SECOND STAGE SECTION MEANT TOTAL US AND SOVIET REDUCTIONS IN BOTH STAGES WOULD EQUAL THE PERCENTAGE OF MANPOWER REDUCED BY EACH OF THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS IN THEIR ALLIANCE. END TEXT. RESOR

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